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JURISDICTION.
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the police officer's request to search Gutierrez's person violate
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution because it exceeded, without reasonable
suspicion, the scope and purpose of the traffic stop?
Standard Of Review: "In search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to . . .
the district court regarding the application of law to underling factual findings." State of
Utah v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ^j8. Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed for
correctness. State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, ^ 5.
Issue No. 2: Did the police officer's Terry Frisk of Gutierrez violate Article I, §
14 of the Utah Constitution where he lacked reasonable suspicion that Gutierrez was
armed and presently dangerous?
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed for
correctness. State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, % 5.
Issue No. 3: Did Gutierrez consent to the search of his person where his consent
was not voluntary and it resulted from Officer Gerfen's exploitation of Gutierrez's illegal
detention?
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed for
correctness. State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, f 5.
Issue No. 4: Was the trial court's factual conclusion finding the beer bottle in
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Gutierrez's car contained alcohol clearly erroneous when the record is void of any
evidence that the bottle still contained beer at the time of its discovery?
Standard of Review: The finding of facts underlying a trial court's decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,112, 78 P.3d 590,
Issue No, 5: Was the search of Gutierrez incident to a lawful arrest for an open
container violation when the statute only applies to containers that contain an alcoholic
beverage and there is no evidence that the beer bottle discovered in Gutierrez's car still
contained beer?
Standard of Review: Constitutional issues are questions of law reviewed for
correctness. State of Utah v. Curry, 2006 UT App. 390, f 5.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND ORDINENCES.
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 14,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526,
Drinking alcoholic beverages and open containers in motor vehicle
prohibited - Definitions - Exceptions.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the same meaning as defined in Section 32A1-105.
(b) "Charted bus" has the same meaning as defined in Section 3 2A-1-105.
(c) "Limousine" has the same meaning as defined in Section 32A-1-105.
(d)(i) "Passenger Compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally
2

occupied by the operator and passengers.
(ii) "Passenger Compartment" includes areas accessible to the operator
and passengers while traveling, including a utility or glove compartment.
(iii) "Passenger Compartment" does not include a separate front or rear
trunk compartment or other area of the vehicle not accessible to the
operator or passengers while inside the vehicle.
(2) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a
motor vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle
is moving stopped, or parked on a highway.
(3) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains
any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or
the contents of the container partially consumed.
(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to a passenger:
(a) in the living quarters of a motor home or camper;
(b) who has carried an alcoholic beverage onto a limousine or charted
bus that is in compliance with subsections 32A-12-213(3)(b) and (c); or
(c) in a motorboat or on waters of this state as these terms are defined in
Section 73-18-2.
(5) Subsection (3) does not apply to passengers traveling in a licensed
taxicab or bus.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature Of The Case,
Gutierrez appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence under
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. This case, at is essence, questions whether the
police violated Gutierrez's rights as guaranteed by Article I, Section 14 when, following
a traffic stop, the police requested consent to search Gutierrez without reasonable
suspicion that he was armed or dangerous, or otherwise possessed contraband on his
person. During the search the police discovered a pipe with methamphetamine residue
inside the hooded sweatshirt worn by Gutierrez.
The State contends that at each phase of the encounter, from the traffic stop to the
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seizure of contraband, the police acted with reasonable suspicion, or in the alternative the
search was incident to a valid arrest, Gutierrez contends the police request to search his
person for anything illegal impermissibly deviated from the original purpose of the traffic
stop without reasonable suspicion that Gutierrez was armed and dangerous, or otherwise
possessed contraband.
Course Of The Proceedings Below,
Gutierrez was charged with "Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance in a
drug free zone" a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i),
"Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a drug free zone" a class A misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann, § 58-37a-5(l), "Speeding" a class C misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46, and "Following Too Close" a class C
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62(1). (Information, R. 1-2). A
preliminary hearing was held on June 1, 2005. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, R. 118).
Officer Gerfen was the only witness called to testify by the State. (Id.) Followint the
preliminary hearing Gutierrez was bound over by the trial court. (Id. at 7:17-22).
Gutierrez subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence challenging the search
of his person by Officer Gerfen. (Motion to Suppress, R. 36-40). In his motion Gutierrez
raided two issues. First, the search of his person violated both the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution because at
moment Officer Gerfen requested consent to search he exceeded the scope of the traffic
stop. (Mot.Suppress, R. 37). Second, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-24 precluded the State
from availing itself of the inevitable discovery doctrine. (Id.) A hearing on the motion
4

was held on August 15, 2005. (Motion to Supress Hearing Transcript, R. 120). At the
conclusion of the hearing the trial court issued its oral ruling from the bench finding
Gutierrez consented to the search of his person, and the discovery of the
methamphetamine rendered Gutierrez's argument under Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-24 moot.
(Prelim. Tr., R. 120, at 8:22-25,9:4-18).
The State, at the request of the trial court, prepared the proposed findings of facts
and conclusions of law. Gutierrez objected to the findings as exceeding the scope of the
trial court's oral ruling because they also claimed the search was incident to a lawful
arrest. ( Objection to Findings of Facts, R. 54). In a subsequent memorandum decision
the trial court overruled Gutierrez's objection ruling that the proposed findings
comported with its prior oral ruling. (Memorandum Decision 10/17/05, R. 61). The trial
court subsequently signed the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law ("Findings of
Facts") as prepared by the State. (Findings of Fact, R. 63-65). Gutierrez then filed a
motion for rehearing on the motion to suppress to specifically address the trial court's
conclusion that the search was incident to a lawful arrest. (Motion for Rehearing, R. 6869). The trial court denied the motion for rehearing. (Id.)
Gutierrez then filed a petition for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals
subsequently issued an order denying Gutierrez permission to appeal the trial court denial
of his motion to suppress. (Utah Court of Appeals Order, R. 78). On March 27, 2006
Gutierrez entered conditional guilty pleas to one count of "Illegal Possession of a
Controlled Substance," a third degree felony and "Use or Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. (Minute Entry 3/27/06, R. 89). Gutierrez,
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pursuant to his plea agreement with the State, preserved his right to challenge the denial
of his motion to suppress. Sentence was imposed against Gutierrez on May 9, 2006. (R.
106-109). On June 8, 2006, Gutierrez filed his Notice of Appeal. (R. 104).
Disposition In The Court Below.
The trial court denied Gutierrez's motion to suppress. It determined that the initial
traffic stop was legal and premised on observed traffic violations. Once the officers
observed the open container of alcohol in the vehicle they had the right to determine if
Gutierrez was impaired. The request to search was therefore legitimate because it
occuixed during the period the officers were entitled to investigate the open container
violation and because consent was granted. After the denial of his motion to suppress
Gutierrez entered a conditional plea of guilty thereby preserving his right to appeal his
motion.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Brigham City Police Officer Travis Gerfen (Officer Gerfen) observed Gutierrez
traveling southbound in Brigham City, Utah. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr, R. 118, at 2:18-25, 3:6-8).
To Officer Gerfen it appeared Gutierrez was following a second vehicle too close. (Id. at
3:8-10). After following Gutierrez a short distance Officer Gerfen used his radar to
determine he was traveling 52 mph in a 35 mph zone. (Id. at 3:10-13). Based on the
speeding violation Officer Gerfen initiated a traffic stop of Gutierrez. (Id. at 3:13). The
traffic stop occurred across the street from the Brigham City Police department during
daytime hours. (Id. at 3:19).
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Officer Gerfen approached Gutierrez from the drivers side window and requested
and obtained a valid drivers license and registration from Gutierrez. (Id at 3:20-21, 5:19). At about this same a second officer arrived to assist Officer Gerfen. (Id. at 21-22).
The second officer approached the passenger side window and told Officer Gerfen that he
could see an open bottle of beer by the drivers side window. (Id. at 21-24). Officer
Gerfen instructed Gutierrez to exit the car 0 4 at 3:24-25). Officer Gerfen than asked
Gutierrez if he was drinking. (Id. at 3:25). According to Officer Gerfen, Gutierrez
admitted to having one beer. (Id. at 4:2)
On cross examination Officer Gerfen acknowledged that he did not administer
field sobriety tests to Gutierrez because did not appear intoxicated. (Id. at 5:24-25, 6:1, 46). He also acknowledged that there was no reason to arrest him for driving under the
influence of alcohol. (Id. at 6:2-3). And Officer Gerfen did not offer any evidence that he
smelled alcohol on either Gutierrez's or his passenger.
Because Gutierrez admitted to drinking, Officer Gerfen asked him if he could
search his person for anything illegal. (Id. at 4:4-5). During the search Officer Gerfen
he found a methamphetamine pipe inside a stocking cap that he removed from Gutierrez
sweatshirt. (Id.)

Officer Gerfen then arrested Gutierrez for possession of

methamphetamine and paraphernalia. (Id. at 4:9-10).
Officer Gerfen, when asked on cross-examination why he wanted to search
Gutierrez, explained, "If I pull somebody out on a traffic stop, if they've been drinking or
if I believe they9 re in the process of committing a crime, I'll search them if they give me
permission." (Id. at 519-23). Officer Gerfen also acknowledged that he could not recall if
7

he returned Gutierrez's license and registration before requesting consent to search him.
(Id at 7-11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Officer Gerfen violated Gutierrez right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures as guaranteed by Article I, § 14 when he asked Gutierrez if he could search his
persons. The discovery of the beer bottle in Gutierrez car, following a valid traffic stop,
created a reasonable suspicion that Gutierrez was intoxicated or had violated the open
container statue. Officer Gerfen, however, was constitutionally obligated to pursue a
means of investigation that would quickly confirm or dispel these possible criminal
violations. The request to search Gutierrez, however, fell outside his expanded authority
to investigate. Officer Gerfen simply lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that
Gutierrez was armed and dangerous, that he had an open container on his person, or that
the search would otherwise disclose information that would diligently confirm or dispels
any concern that Gutierrez was intoxicated or violated the open container statute.
The search of Gutierrez was also not a valid search under the Terry Doctrine. A
traditional Terry frisk required Officer Gerfen to have a reasonable articulable suspicion
that Gutierrez was armed or dangerous. There is no evidence in the record, however, to
support this conclusion. Instead, by Officer Gerfen's own admission, he requested
consent to search as a matter of practice rather than any particular concern or belief that
Gutierrez was concealing a weapon.
Gutierrez's consent to search was obtained through duress and coercion and the
exploitation of Officer Gerfen's prior illegal conduct. Under the totality of the
8

circumstances the State cannot meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that Gutierrez's consent was voluntary. Gutierrez was never informed that he
could refuse the request. At the time the request was made Officer Gerfen still possessed
Gutierrez's drivers license and registration so that he was not free to leave. And the
request was made immediately after Gutierrez was ordered out of the car. Taken together
the State cannot prove Gutierrez will was not overborne or his capacity for self
determination was not critically impaired.
Furthermore, Gutierrez's consent was obtained through Officer

Gerfen

exploitation of the illegal detention. When conducting an exploitation analysis the court
evaluates the relationship between the police misconduct and the illegally obtained
evidence to determine if excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities.
Officer Gerfen admitted that it is his practice to ask for consent to search whenever he
removes a driver from their vehicle regardless of his constitutional obligation to strictly
tie his investigatory questioning to the facts and circumstances that justified the stop in
the first place. This demonstrates that Officer Gerfen engages in the illegal questioning
for the primary purpose of exploiting his misconduct to gain consent to search. Officer
Gerfen's purpose of exploiting his misconduct also demonstrates a direct connection
between his misconduct and Gutierrez's consent. Suppressing the evidence derived from
the illegal detention would serve to deter future misconduct. In addition the record is
void of any intervening circumstances that created a clean break between the chain of
events connecting the misconduct to Gutierrez's consent. Finally, the temporal proximity
between the illegal detention and Gutierrez's consent was negligible and strongly
9

indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to
dissipate.
The trial court's finding that the beer bottle contained alcohol was clearly
erroneous. The only facts entered into the record regarding the beer bottle were provided
by Officer Gerfen. They included to three specific facts, (1) Officer Gerfen learned from
an assisting officer that there was an open beer bottle on the drivers side, (2) the assisting
officer observed the bottle while standing next to the passenger side window, (3) Officer
Gerfen stated that "if he had an open container in his vehicle, I generally don't write
citations for that." In contrast, there is no evidence that Officer Gerfen attempted to
examine the bottle to determine if it was empty or it contained alcohol. Gutierrez was
never cited for an open container violation. Officer Gerfen did not claim he smelled
alcohol on either Gutierrez or his passenger's breath.

Gutierrez did not appear

intoxicated and he was not subjected to field sobriety tests. Finally, Officer Gerfen stated
that his decision to arrest Gutierrez stemmed from the illegal discovery of
methamphetamine and notfromthe beer bottle discovered in the car.
Finally, the search of Gutierrez was not a search incident to a valid arrest. To fall
within this exception to the warrant requirement the State has the burden of proving (1)
the arrest was lawful, (2) the search was in the area of the suspect's immediate control,
and (3) the search was contemporaneous to the arrest. Gutierrez concedes that the State
can satisfy the second and third prongs. The real question in this case is if the arrest of
Gutierrez was lawful. The op^n container statute prohibits the transportation of an
alcoholic container if it still contains alcohol, the container has been opened, its seal
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broken, or the contents partially consumed. In this case there is no evidence in the record
to suggest Officer Gerfeti examined the beer bottle to determine if any of its contents
remained! As noted above he did not claim to detect odor on the bream of either
Gutierrez or his passenger. Gutierrez did not appear intoxicated, and there was no
evidence that Officer Gerfen observed any physical indications that either individual was
drinking beer in the car.
The above considerations establish that Officer Gerfen violated Gutierrez rights
guaranteed by Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. The Court of Appeals must reverse
the trial court's denial of Gutierrez motion to suppress.
ARGUMENT
I.

OFFICER GERFEN'S REQUEST TO SEARCH GUTIERREZ
VIOLATED ARTICLE L S14 BECAUSE IT EXCEEDED, WITHOUT
REASONABLE SUSPICION, THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE
TRAFFIC STOP.
Article I, Section 14 provides, "the right of the people to be secure in their

persons, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall no be
violated;..." Utah Const. Article I, Section. 14. This right prohibits a police officer
from stopping a vehicle unless he has reasonable suspicion the driver has committed a
crime. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650. Once a traffic stop is made the
officers authority to question the driver must remain tightly moored to the conduct that
justified the stop in thefirstplace. Id. at f 29. This means the officer's investigatory
authority is strictly limited to requesting a valid drivers license and registration,
conducting a warrants check, and issuing a citation. Id. at 31. The officer must then
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allow the driver to depart. Id. Any investigation beyond the original purpose of the
traffic stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity. Id.
Absent new evidence the expanded investigation is illegal. Id.
Even when faced with additional evidence of criminal activity the police are
constitutionally obligated to diligently pursue a means of investigation that quickly
confirms or dispels the officer's new suspicions. State v. Lafond, 2003 UT App. 101, f
14, 68 P.3d 1043. The new investigation must further remain strictly tied to the facts and
circumstances giving rise to the officer new suspicions. Id. Failure to do so renders the
expanded investigation illegal. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 31.
A traffic violation committed in presence of a police officer is a constitutionally
sufficient basis for stopping a driver. Id. at 30. In the present case Officer Gerfen stopped
Gutierrez for speeding. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:10-13). Once Officer Gerfen
observed the traffic violation he possessed the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop
Gutierrez. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, <f 30. His authority to seize and detain Gutierrez,
however, was strictly limited to performing those acts necessary to request a valid
driver's license and registration, conduct a warrants check and issue the citation for the
observed traffic violations. Id. at % 31. Shortly after the traffic stop, however, an assisting
officer noticed a beer bottle inside the vehicle. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:21-24).
This newly observed evidence expanded Officer Gerfen's authority and permitted him to
investigate both the presence of the container and whether Gutierrez was driving while
intoxicated.
Officer Gerfen, however, was constitutionally obligated to pursue a means of
12

investigation that would quickly dispel or confirm whether Gutierrez violated the open
container statue or whether he was driving while intoxicated. State v. Lafond, 2003 UT
App. 101, % 14 Officer Gerfen nevertheless ignored his constitutional obligations and
instead immediately asked Gutierrez if he could search his person. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R.
118, at 3: 21-25,4:1-5). Later during the preliminary hearing, when asked why, Officer
Gerfen simply explained, "if I pull somebody out of a traffic stop, if they've been
drinking or if I believe they're in the process of committing a crime, I search them if they
give me permission to." (Id. at 5:19-23). By Officer Gerfen's own admission his request
to search was made as a matter of general practice and not because of some reasonable
articulable concern that Gutierrez possessed contraband, or posed a threat to Officer
Gerfen's safety.
The absence of reasonable articulable suspicion is further illuminated by the
totality of facts and circumstance confronting Officer Gerfen, and his reaction to those
facts. Regarding any fear that Gutierrez was driving while intoxicated, Officer Gerfen
admitted in his testimony that he did not administer field sobriety tests to Gutierrez
because he did not appear intoxicated. (Id at 6:1-6).
Confronted with a possible open container violation, Officer Gerfen did nothing to
diligently dispel or confirm that concern. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526, the
open container statute, " a person may not keep, carry, possess, transport... in the
passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any
container which contains any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its
seal broken, or the contents of the container partially consumed. Id. at (3)(emphasis
13

added). The statue, when read as a whole, requires that the container actually contain
alcohol and it does not prohibit the transportation of empty beer bottles, cans or other
empty alcohol containers. To construe the statue otherwise would cause undesired results
such as dissuading the collection of litter, or the recycling of bottles and cans.
In his testimony Officer Gerfen admitted to learning of the beer bottlefroman
assisting officer, who in turn observed the bottle in the driver side compartment while
standingat the passenger side window. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:19-24). There is
nothing in the record, however, that demonstrates Officer Gerfen, or the assisting officer,
examined the bottle to determine if it contained alcohol. Instead, Officer Gerfen
immediately asked Gutierrez if he could search his person. (Id. at 3:24-25). Yet the
record is void of any facts articulated by Officer Gerfen that explain how searching
Gutierrez would assist him in determining whether he violated the open container statue.
n.

OFFICER GERFEN5 SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS NOT
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE TERRY DOCTRINE BECAUSE HE
LACKED REASONABLE SUSPCION THAT GUTIERREZ WAS
ARMED OR OTHEWISE POSED A THREAT TO OFFICER
SAEFTY.
Officer Gerfen's search of Gutierrez was not justified under the Terry Doctrine.

"Traditional Terry Frisk requires that the officer have reasonable, articulable suspicion
the suspect is armed and dangerous." State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, % 32,103 P.3d 699.
The Terry Doctrine grewfromthe need to balance society's interest in promoting officer
safety against its interest in protecting individual liberty from arbitrary police actions.
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 25, 78 P.3d 590. There is, without doubt, an inherent
danger in all traffic stops. Id. at f 23. The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged, however,
14

this "danger can be fully or partially mitigated by ordering the occupants out of the
vehicle." Id. at f 22. This slight intrusion on individual liberty, even in the absence of
reasonable suspicion, is justified in order to allow the police officer to operate in safety.
A£ at m 24-25.
In contrast, "a Terry frisk is an intrusion of greater magnitude" that "may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly." Id. at
f 25. A Terry frisk is therefore prohibited unless the police officer possesses reasonable
articulable facts that "lead a reasonable person to believe the suspect may be armed and
presently dangerous." Id. at ^ 29. In Brake the Utah Supreme Court further explained
that for crimes "such as trafficking in small quantities of narcotics, possession of
marijuana, underage drinking, driving under the influence and lesser traffic offenses . . .
there must be particular facts that lead the officer to believe the suspect is armed." State
v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, f 32 (quoting State v. Warren, 2001 UT App. 346, f 15, 37 P.3d
270).
Applying these principles to the present case, the record clearly shows Officer
Gerfen's search of Gutierrez was not justified. Gutierrez was stopped for minor traffic
violations and upon the discovery of the beer bottle was immediately ordered out of his
vehicle. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:21-25). Any inherent danger of the traffic stop
itself was at least partially, if not fully, mitigated by Gutierrez exit from his car. State v.
Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 22
Once Gutierrez was outside his car the nature of the crimes required Officer
Gerfen to have particular facts that would lead him to believe Gutierrez was armed and
15

presently dangerous. Id. at ^f 29. The record is void of the required facts. Instead Officer
Gerfen explained that his desire to search Gutierrez was based solely on Gutierrez's
admission to drinking a beer. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 4:4-5). Officer Gerfen also
testified that the focus of his search was not weapons but "anything illegal" Gutierrez
might possess. (Id.)
Absent from the record is also any indication that Gutierrez was acting aggressive
or threatening. There is no allegation that Officer Gerfen noticed any weapons in the car,
or any bulge or object on Gutierrez's person that suggested he possessed a weapon of any
kind. When considered with the fact that the traffic stop occurred across the street from
the Brigham City Police Station during daylight hours, Officer Gerfen simply had no
basis to form a reasonable articulable suspicion that Gutierrez was armed and presently
dangerous. (Id at 3:19-20).
It instead appears that Officer Gerfen engaged in a pattern and practice of asking
consent to search the drivers during his traffic stops. When asked why he wanted to
search Gutierrez, Officer Gerfen explained, "if I pull somebody out on a traffic stop, if
they've been drinking or I believe they are in the process of committing a crime, I'll
always search them if they give me permission to." (Id, at 5:21-25). This practice was
specifically rejected by the Utah Supreme Court as impermissible investigative
questioning the unconstitutionally expanded the scope of the traffic stop. State v.
Hansen, 2002 UT 125,132, 63 P.3d 650.
In Hansen the arresting officer stopped Hansen for an illegal lane change and lack
of insurance. Id. at f 6. Once the officer determined that Hansen's drivers license and
16

registration were current he returned the documents to Hansen with a warning to obtain
car insurance. Id. at % 12. Before letting Hansen leave, however, the officer asked him if
"he had any alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the car." Id. at % 13. When Hansen replied
"no" the officer asked permission to search the vehicle. Id. During the motion to
suppress hearing the officer conceded he lacked reasonable suspicion that Hansen was
committing some additional crime. Id. at ^ 32. The officer instead admitted, "it's my
practice to ask them for consent" to search the car. Id at f 14. On review the Utah
Supreme Court determined that once the officer started questioning Hansen about alcohol
and drugs the officer had "exceeded, without justification, the purpose of the initial traffic
stop." Id. at % 32. Hansen's continued detention was subsequently illegal. Id.
III.

GUTIERREZ DID NOT CONSENT TO THE SEARCH,
Valid consent requires that (1) the consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the

consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegal detention. Id. at f 47.
Ruling on Gutierrez's motion to suppress the trial court concluded that Gutierrez
consented to the search by Officer Gerfen. The question of voluntary consent is a legal
conclusion reviewed for correctness. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 51. Similarly,
determining if consent was obtained by exploiting the prior illegal detention is a legal
conclusion that is also reviewed for correctness. Id. at 61.
A.

Gutierrez's Consent Was Not Voluntary,
"When the State attempts to prove that there was voluntary consent after an illegal

detention, it has a much heavier burden to satisfy then when consent is given after a
permissible detention. Id. at % 51. Relying on the totality of the circumstances the State
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must prove voluntary consent by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. f 56. This requires
the State to prove Gutierrez consented without duress or coercion, that his will was not
overborne or his capacity for self determination was not critically impaired. Id. at f 57.
Duress or coercion may be demonstrated by a defendant's low intelligence,
evidence of minimal school, lack of any effective warnings about his rights and the
timing of the requests to search. Id. A lack of duress or coercion may be demonstrated by
(1) the absence of a claim of authority, (2) the absence of an exhibition of force, (3) a
mere request to search, (4) cooperation by the defendant* (5) the absence of deception or
trick by the officer. Id.
Applying these factors, Gutierrez did not receive any warnings about his right to
refuse the search. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 4:4-5). The request was made
immediately after he was ordered out of the car. (Id. at 3:24-25,4:1-5). This timing
strongly implied he was notfreeto refuse the officer's request to search. At the time the
request was made, Officer1 Gerfren still had Gutierrez's drivers license and registration in
his possession. (Id. at 4:25, 5:1-9, 6:7-16). By retaining these documents Officer Gerfen
demonstrated force and authority over Gutierrez since he was not otherwise free to leave.
Officer Gerfen's authority to prohibit Gutierrez from leaving also implied the authority
require Gutierrez to remain at the scene until he gave consent to search.
On the other hand, there is no indication in the record that Officer Gerfen used
deception or trickery to gain consent. Gutierrez is seemingly a person of average
intelligence with a more than minimal schooling. There is no evidence in the record to
suggest the request to search was anything more than a request. Nevertheless, the State,
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in consideration of the totality of the circumstances, cannot prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that Gutierrez's consent was voluntary.
B. Gutierrez's Consent Resulted From The Police Exploitation Of His
Illegal Detention,
"When conducting an exploitation analysis, a court evaluates the relationship
between official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if
excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities." State v. Hansen, 2002
UT 125, f 62. The purpose is to "compel respect for the constitutional guaranty . . . by
removing the incentive to disregard it." Id.
Relevant factors include "(1) the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct, (2)
the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the temporal proximity between the
illegal detention and consent." Id at f 64. "The purpose and flagrancy factor directly
relates to the deterrent value of the suppression." Id. at % 65 "The need for deterrence is
strongest where criminal sanctions against the defendant may result." Id. at f 63. When
an officer engages in illegal conduct for the purpose of obtaining consent then
suppression of the illegally obtained evidence will clearly have a deterrent effective. Id.
atf 65.
Applying these considerations in Hansen, the Supreme Court concluded the
officer's overriding "purpose of the illegal detention was to exploit the opportunity to ask
for consent." Id at f 66. Similarly, Officer Gerfen admitted that it is his practice to ask
for consent to search whenever he removes a driver from his vehicle. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr.,
R. 118, at 5:21-23). He employed this practice against Gutierrez and requested consent
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to search even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. These facts demonstrate that, like
the officer in Hansen, Officer Gerfen engages in the illegal detention for the primary
purpose of exploiting the opportunity in order to gain consent.
In Hansen the Supreme Court also concluded that the officer's objective to exploit
the illegal detention demonstrated a direct connection between the officer's misconduct
and Hansen's consent. Id. The Court further noted that 'the incentive present in this case
to violate constitutional guarantees is precisely the type of incentive that must be
removed." Id. ^ 67. Again the parallels between Officer Gerfen's conduct and the
Hansen case are strong. Officer's Gerfen's objective to exploit the illegal detention
demonstrates a direct connection between the purpose underlying his misconduct and
Gutierrez's consent. Suppressing the evidence derived from Officer Gerfen's misconduct
will have a deterrent effect on him and his fellow officers. See, Id. at ^f 67.
Additionally there were no intervening factors between Officer Gerfen's
misconduct and Gutierrez's consent. To cure the misconduct, intervening factors require
some occurrence that creates a clean break in the chain of events connecting the
misconduct to Gutierrez's consent. See, Id. at ^f 68. In this instance, however, Officer
Gerfen obtained consent on the heels of his misconduct, and the record is void of any
intervening circumstance. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:21-25, 4:1-7).
The final consideration is the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and
consent. "A brief time lapse between the [constitutional] violation and consent often
indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to
dissipate." Id. at f 69. In Hansen the Supreme Court noted that the "lapse of time was

negligible" because the illegal detention started when the officer questioned Hansen
about drugs in his vehicle and was immediately followed by the request for and the
granting of consent. Id. Similarly, the illegal detention of Gutierrez started when Officer
Gerfen, without reasonable suspicion, asked Gutierrez if he could search his person.
Gutierrez immediately granted permission rendering the time lapse between the
misconduct and the consent negligible and insufficient to allow the taint of Officer
Gerfen's misconduct to dissipate.
Based on the purpose behind Officer Gerfen's misconduct, the lack of intervening
circumstances, and the negligible temporal proximity between the misconduct and
consent, the consent to search granted by Gutierrez resulted from the Officer Gerfen's
exploitation of his prior illegality.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING OFFICER'S GERFEN'S
SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS INCIDENT TO A VALID
ARREST.
In its Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter "Findings") the trial

court ruled Officer Gerfen's search of Gutierrez was a valid search incident to an arrest.
(Finding of Facts, R. 64, at % 1). Gutierrez objected to this portion of the Findings
because the trial court oral's ruling did not address that issue. (Objection to Finding of
Facts Conclusion of Law, R. 54, at f 2). As demonstrated by the record, the trial court
only addressed the issues of consent to search and whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-24
prohibited Officer Gerfen from arresting Gutierrez. (Supp. Hr'g Tr., R, 120, at 8:22-25,
9:6-18). On the first issue it ruled Gutierrez consented to the search. (Id. at 8:22-25). It
then ruled the second issue was rendered moot by the discovery of drugs. (Id. at 9:6-18)
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The trial court nevertheless issued a memorandum decision overruling Gutierrez's
objections and entered the finding of facts and conclusions of law as proposed by the
State. (Mem. Decision, R. 61-62; Finding of Facts, R. 63-65). The Finding of Facts
proposed by the State provided the first instance wherein the trial court addressed the
State's claim the search was incident to a valid arrest.
A.

The Trial Court's Committed Clear Error When It Found The Beer
Bottle In Gutierrez's Car Contained Alcohol.
The findings of fact underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to

suppress is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,
f 12. As discussed below the trial court's sole basis for concluding the search was
incident to a lawful arrest is the alleged open container violation. (Finding of Facts, R.
63-65). Probable cause to arrest Gutierrez for this violation could only exist, however, if
there was a reasonable basis to believe the beer bottle actually contained alcohol. Under
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526 the possession or transportation of an alcoholic beverage in
a motor vehicle is only prohibited if the container has alcohol in it, it has been opened, or
its seal broken, or the contents partially consumed. Id. at (3). The statue, read as a whole,
does not prohibit the transportation of empty beer bottles, cans or other empty alcohol
containers. To construe the statute otherwise would cause undesired results such as
dissuading the collection of litter, or the recycling of bottles and cans.
The only facts entered into the record regarding the beer bottle were provided by
Officer Gerfen when he testified at the preliminary hearing. His testimony, however, was
limited to three specific facts: (1) Officer Gerfen learned there was an open beer bottle on
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the drivers side of the vehicle from an assisting officer; (2) the assisting officer observed
the beer bottle from the passenger side window; (3) Officer Gerfen's statement in
reference to Gutierrez that, "If he had an open beer container in his vehicle, I generally
don't write citations for that." (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 3:21-24,6:25,7:1-3).
A police officer, when confronted with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
beyond the original purpose of the traffic stop, is obligated to pursue a course of
investigation that quickly confirms or dispels his suspicions. Lafond, 2003 UT App. 101,
*! 14. Yet, there is no indication in the record that Officer Gerfen pursued any
investigation at all. The record instead shows that he immediately used this information
as an opportunity to gain consent to search Gutierrez. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, 3;21-25,
4:1-7). Without this investigation the trial court was left without a sufficient factual basis
to conclude the beer bottle observed in Gutierrez car contained alcohol.
Conversely, there is substantial evidence that undermines the trial court's finding.
The record clearly shows that Officer Gerfen never cited Gutierrez for an open container
violation. (Id. at 6:12-14). Nor was he charged with that crime by the State. (Information,
R. 1). There is nothing in the record to suggest Officer Gerfen ever examined the beer
bottle to determine whether it was empty or contained alcohol. There is no evidence in
the record to suggest that either Officer Gerfen or the assisting officer observed the smell
of alcohol on either Gutierrez or his passenger. The scent of alcohol on either person
would help support a belief that one or the other was drinking beerfromthe bottle found
in the car. Although Gutierrez admitted to previously drinking a beer there is nothing in
the record to establish its temporal proximity to the traffic stop. Gutierrez was never
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subjected to field sobriety tests despite the discovery of the beer bottle. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr.,
R. 118, at 6:4-6). When Officer Gerfen was asked on cross examination why he did not
administer field sobriety tests he explained the Gutierrez did not appear intoxicated. (Id.)
Officer Gerfen also explained that his decision to arrest Gutierrez stemmed from the
discovery of the methamphetamine and not from the beer bottle. (Id. at 4:9-12). When
viewed under the totality of the circumstances the facts, including all reasonable
inference, fail to support the trial court's conclusion the bottle found in Gutierrez's car
contained beer.
V.

OFFICER GERFEN'S SEARCH OF GUTIERREZ WAS NOT A
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST,
The trial court's legal conclusion that the search of Gutierrez was a search incident

to a lawful arrest is reviewed correctness. To fall within this exception to the warrant
requirement the State has the burden of proving (1) the arrest was lawful, (2) the search
was in the area of the suspect's immediate control, and (3) the search is conducted
contemporaneously to the arrest. State v. Amirkhizi, 2004 UT App 324, f 16, 100 P.3d
225.
Gutierrez concedes that the second and third prongs of the tests are satisfied.
After all, the search was of his person and occurred almost immediately after the
discovery of the beer bottle. The true question in this case is whether the beer bottle
observed in Gutierrez's vehicle formed a lawful basis for arresting him. It did not. For a
wanantless arrest to be lawful it must be supported by probable cause. Probable cause in
turn requires facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to
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warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing the suspect has or is
currently committing a crime. State v. Chansamone, 2003 UT App. 107, % 11.
Under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526, " a person may not keep, carry, possess,
transport... in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle, when the vehicle is on any
highway, any container which contains any alcoholic beverage if the container has been
opened, its seal broken, or the contents of the container partially consumed. Id. at
(3)(emphasis added). Probable cause to arrest Guiterrez for an open container required
Officer Gerfen to have within his knowledge facts and circumstance that would lead a
prudent officer to believe the beer bottle actually contained beer.
Nothing in the record suggests that Officer Gerfen ever examined the bottle to
determine if any of its contents remained. There is nothing in the record to suggest the
bottle contained liquid in any form. As noted above Officer Gerfen admitted that
Gutierrez did not appear intoxicated. (Prelim. Hr'g Tr., R. 118, at 6:4-6). There is no
allegation that he smelled alcohol on either Gutierrez's or his passenger's breath or
observed any other physical indication that either was drinking while driving in
Gutierrez's car. Because Officer Gerfen failed to determine if the bottle still contained
beer he lacked the probable cause to conclude Gutierrez violated Utah open container
statute.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above Gutierrez respectfully request an order from the Utah
Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress.
DATED this 9th day of November 2006.
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EXHIBIT 1
(Information)

UGR/Ji DISTRICT COURTS

Amy F. Hugie, 8207
Box Elder County Attorney
01 South Main
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: (435) 734-3329
Fax:
(435) 734-3374

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

INFORMATION

Plaintiff,

Court Case #:

vs.
ALFREDO MUNOZ GUTIERREZ
228 W. 100 N. Apt. 4
Brigham City, UT 84302
DOB: 10/30/1982,

Judge:

Defendant.
The undersigned, as prosecuting attorney states on information and belief that
the above-named defendant, in Box Elder County, State of Utah, committed the
following crime(s):
COUNT 1

^

POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ( c f c ) (559), a sepejfid
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), as follows: That Alfredo
Munoz Gutierrez on or about March 6, 2005, did knowingly and intentionally possess or
use a controlled substance, to wit, methamphetamine, and committed the-offonsc within
i^a thousand feet of a cchool, churoh, or public parking lot.

J/.

COUNT 2
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA (DFZ) (1269), a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(1), as follows: That Alfredo Munoz Gutierrez

on or about March 6, 2005, did knowingly, intentionally or recklessly use, or possess
with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body. Furthermore, the defendant committed the offense
within a thousand feet of a school, church, or public parking lot.
COUNT 3
SPEEDING (108), a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46, as
follows: That Alfredo Munoz Gutierrez on or about March 6, 2005, did operate a vehicle
at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions, giving regard
to the actual and potential hazards then existing, to wit: 57 miles per hour in a 35 miles
per hour zone.
COUNT 4
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE (50), a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-62(1), as follows: That Alfredo Munoz Gutierrez on or about March 6, 2005, did
follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for
the speed of the vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness: Cpl.
Travis Gerfen.
DATED this

(G

day of

, 2005.

jgie

County Attorney
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EXHIBIT 2
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript)
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU-RT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 051100099
Transcript of Audio CD.

vs
ALFREDO GUTIERREZ,
Defendant.

Transcript of Preliminary Hearing.
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding,
First District Court Courthouse
Brigham City, Utah
June 1, 2005

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:

BRAD C. SMITH
Deputy County Attorney

For the Defendant:

MARTIN V. GRAVIS
Attorney at Law

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
P. 0. Box 873
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873

ORIGINAL

FILED
UTAH APPW f ME COURTS

SEP 2 5 2006
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THE CLERK:

Case number 05110099, State of Utah

versus Alfredo Gutierrez.

Counsel, please state your names

for the record.
MR. SMITH:

Brad Smith, State of Utah.

MR. GRAVIS:

Martin Gravis for the defendant,

Alfredo Gutierrez.
THE COURT:

This is the time scheduled for a

preliminary hearing.
MR. SMITH:
MR. GRAVIS:

Are the parties ready to proceed?
We are.
The defense is ready, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

You may call your first witness.

MR. SMITH:

The state calls Officer Travis Gerfen.

TRAVIS GERFEN,
being first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SMITH:
Q. Officer Gerfen, will you state your name for the record.
A. Travis Gerfen.
Q. And who are you employed by?
A. Brigham City police department.
Q. And what is your position with the Brigham City police
department'?
A. I'm a corporal on patrol.
Q. Are you familiar with the defendant, Alfredo Gutierrez?
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A. I am.
Q. How do you know him?
A. I conducted a traffic stop on March 6th, 2005.
Q. Could you describe what the circumstances of that stop
were?
A. I was on patrol.

I was down by the north 7-Eleven

between Main Street and First East.
Rodeo traveling southbound.

I saw a green Isuzu

It appeared he was too close to

ano ther vehicle, so I pulled out on Main Street to get there
and see how close he was.

By the time I turned onto Main

Street he was quite a ways up there, so I turned on my radar,
the same direction of travel as he was.

He was going 52

mil as per hour in a 35 and so I pulled him over.
Q. Okay.

Wh$t happened when you pulled the vehicle over?

A. He stopped.
Q. And who was driving the vehicle?
A. It was Alfredo Gutierrez.
Q. Okay.
A. He stopped right in front of the police department
sou thbound on Main Street.

I went up to him, talked to him,

got his information, driver!s license and registration.

At

tha t time Officer Panner showed up and he went up to the
passenger side window and told me that he could see an open
beer bottle by the driver's side.

At that point I asked him

to exit and asked him if he was drinking.
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Q. What did he say?
A. Umm, he said he only had had one beer.
Q. What happened next?
A. I as]ked him if I could search his person to see if he had
anything illegal, because he had been drinking.

In his sweat

shi rt pocket he had a winter type stocking hat; and inside
that hat was a methamphetamine pipe with residue.
Q. What happened next?
A. I placed him under arrest for that, for the possession of
methamphetamine and paraphernalia.

Officer Panner g ot the

passenger information and he had warrants and so he was also
arrested for his warrants.
Q. How did you recognize the methamphetamine in the pipe?
A. From my training and experience, three years in the

1

strike force.

Q. And what did you do with the pipe?
A. I took it to the police department and placed it into

J

evi dence
MR. SMITH:

Okay.

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Mr. Gravis.

Thatfs all I have.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q. Was the residue, or whatever, in the pipe tested 9
A. It was, but I do not have the results from it.
Q. Okay

Now, you say you stopped Mr. Gutierrez and he gave

1

Page 5
you a valid driver's license, correct?
A. I can't remember if he did or not.
Q. You never gave him a ticket for no driver's license?
A. I don't believe I did.
Q. He gave you the registration and insurance and all that
stuff, right?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. And everything appeared to be in order, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And what address was on the driver's license?
A. I don't remember that.

I don't write that down

generally.
Q. Was it a local address?
A. That I couldn't tell you.
Q. Okay.

Now, you say that the other officer saw a beer in

the car and you asked Mr. Gutierrez if he'd been drinking and
he said one beer, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. You asked him to step out of the vehicle and then you
asked to search him.

Why did you want to search him?

A. If I pull somebody out on a traffic stop, if they've been
drinking or if I believe they're in the process of committing
a crime, I'll search them if they give me permission to.
Q. Okay.

He'd been drinking but he did not appear to be

intoxicated, right?
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A. He did not, no.
Q- So you had no reason to arrest him for DUI, correct?
A. I did not arrest him for DUI, no.
Q. Okay.

In fact, you never even asked him to do field

sobriety tests, correct?
A. He didn!t appear to be intoxicated.
Q. And at this time where was his paperwor k, his 1 icense,
registration, insurance card?
A. I don't remember.
Q. He handed it to you.

Had you given it back to him?

J

A. I don't remember.
Q. Had you written him a citation at that point in time?

1

A. If I did, there isn't a copy of the citation in the
report.

I don!t think I wrote a citation.

Q. You placed him under arrest after you searched him,

1

correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Okay.

Prior to finding the pipe in his jacket, did you

1

have any reason to believe that if you wrot e him a traffic
citation he would not appear in court?
A. Generally, if they have meth on them, I 'm not g oing to —

1

Q- Prior to discovering that did you have any reason to

1

bel ieve that if you wrote him a citation he would not appear
in court?
A. If he had an open beer container in his vehicle

'

J
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generally don f t write a citation for that.
(unintelligible) .

I usually

So with that information alone, no, 'I

wouldn't write him a citation.
Q. You wouldn't write him a citation because he had an open
container?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay.

So you would have arrested him, is what you're

saying, and searched him anyway?
A. That's correct.
MR. GRAVIS:

Okay.

I have nothing further.

THE COURT:

Any redirect?

MR. SMITH:

No.

THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. SMITH:

The state rests.

MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

Your next witness.

We'll submit it, Your Honor.
Based on the evidence presented at the

1
1

preliminary hearing, the court finds that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant committed

1

the offense of possession of a controlled substance within a
thousand feet of a public facility, use or possession of drug 1
paraphernalia, speed ing, and following a vehicle too closely.
Therefore he'll be held to answer on those charges.
He has the forma 1 information there.

Does he waive the

formal reading of th ose charges?
MR. GRAVIS:

I don't have a copy of the formal

J
1
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information.
THE COURT:

We can make a copy for you.

One was

originally g.iven to him, but I think he had other counsel.
MR. GRAVIS:

Yes.

I have police reports., but I

didn't get a copy of the information.
THE COURT:

Let me go ahead and hand you the file

and you can show it to him.

Ifll ask if he wants to waive

the formal reading o f those charges?
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

We will waive the reading, Your Honor.
All right.

After the hearing, if you

like, you can take the file downstairs and get a copy then.
As to those four counts, how does the defendant plead?
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

Not guilty.
How much time would you like before we

do further scheduling?
MR. GRAVIS:

When is your next arraignment date,

Your Honor?
THE COURT:

I can give you a pretrial on either June

22 or July 5th.
MR. GRAVIS:
June 22nd.

I know I can't do July 5th.

Let's do

1

What time, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

10:00 on June 22nd for a pretrial.

We'll see you then.
(Hearing concluded.)

1
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C E R T I F I C A T E

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the CD recorded hearing was
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for
the State of Utah.
That a full, true and correct transcription of the
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the
pages numbered 2 to 8, inclusive.
I further certify that the original transcript was
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box Elder
County, Brigham City, Utah.
Dated this 7th day of September, 2006.

Cj^y^
Rodney MM Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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EXHIBIT 3
(Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support)

MARTIN V. GRAVIS (#1237)
ATTORNEY FOR ALFREDO GUTIERREZ

2562 Washington Boulevard
Odgen, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8247
Fax: (801) 334-7275
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT THEREOF

Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGE BEN HADFIELD

ALFREDO GUTIERREZ,

CASE No. 051100099

Defendant.

COMES Now, Defendant, by and through his Attorney, Martin V. Gravis, and
hereby moves the above entitled Court to Suppress statements of the defendant. This
motion is based upon the 4 TH and 14 TH Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I,
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE DEFENDANT was

driving a vehicle in Brigham City, Utah, on March 6, 2005 when he

was stopped for violatio of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-46, speeding, and 41-6-55, following to
close. After the officer stopped the defendant he saw an open bottle of beer by the passenger. The
officer then asked the defendant for permission to search him but had no reason to believe the
defendant had any open containers on him. The officer found the alleged contraband in a hat in
the defendant's coat pocket. The officer then arrested the defendant and also charged him a
violation of 41-6-44.20, open container.
The offier testified that he did not remember if the defendant had a valid drivers license
(he did) and where the defendant lived, (he lives in Brigham city).

STATE OF UTAH VS. ALFREDO GUTIERREZ
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF

CASE No. 051100099

ARGUEMENT
POINT I

THE OFFICER exceeded the scope of the traffic stop by extending the stop to obtain
consent to search the defendant, therefore the consent was illegally obtained as a result of the
illegal detention and illegal.
In State v. Godina-Luna 826 P2d.652 (Utah App. 1992), the Court said as follows:
[3] Once a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred, any detention for reasons
exceeding the scope of the original stop and not reasonably related to the
circumstances justifying the stop in the first place, is illegal. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-79, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Robinson,
797 P.2d 431, 437-38 (Utah App. 1990).
[4] In other words, "[t]he length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied
to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761,763 (Utah 1991); (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 1920, 88 S. Ct. At 1879), Once the reasons for the initial stop have been satisfied,
the individual *655 must be allowed to proceed on his or her way. "Any further
temporary detention for ivestigative questioning after the fulfillment of the
purpose for the initial traffic stop is justified under the fourth amendment only if
the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity."
Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435 (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519
(10th Cir. 1998)).
Since the officer's request to search the defendant was not related to the stop or even the
open container and occurred prior to the issuance of any citation, it constitutes an illegal search
because of the illegal detention of the defendant and the defendant's consent was obtained as a
result of the officer's illegal act.
POINT II

The State cannot argue inevitable discovery since the officer could not have legally
arrested the defendant for the open container violation.
Title 41-6-166 says as follows:
Appearance upon arrest for misdemeanor- Setting bond. Whenever any
person is arrested for any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor, the arrested
person, for the purpose of setting bond, shall in the following cases, be taken without
unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is
alleged to have been nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where said
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arrest is made, in any of the following cases:
(1) When a person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate.
(2) When the person is arrested upon a charge of driving or being in actual physical
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination
thereof as prescribed in Section 41-6-44.
(3) When the person is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of an accident
causeing death, personal injuries, or damage to property.
(4) In any other event when the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to
appear in court as herinafter provided, or when in the discretion of the arresting officer, a
written promise to appear in insufficient.
This statute has not been interpreted by the appellate courts but was raised in both the
Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Harmon 654 P.2d
1037 (Utah App. 1993) 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). The Appellate Courts determined in that
case that since Harmon was for driving on suspension which is not an offense under 41-6-et.seq.
that 41-6-166 did not apply but the Supreme Court did say as follows:
These factors notwithstanding, we conclude that Harmon's arrest for driving on
suspension was not unreasonable in light of the governmental interest in removing unlicensed
drivers from the road for public safety reasons. Other jurisdictions have uniformly held that
driving on suspension is sufficiently serious to justify the offender's arrest rather that mere
detention and citation. See, e.g., State v. S.P., 580 S. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 592 So.2d 682 (1991); People v. Anderson, 169 111. App. 3d 289, 120 111. Dec. 123,129,
523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040, appeal denied, 122 I11.2d 579, 125 Ill.Dec.223, 530 N.E.2d 251 (1988),
Page 1204
cert. Denied, 490 U.S. 1036, 109 S.Ct. 1935, 194 L.Ed.2d 407 (1989); State v. Pierce, 136 N.J.
184, 642 A.2d947, 958 (1994) (upholding arrest in part because driving on suspension "poses
grave danger to the public"); State v. Hollis. 161 Vt. 87, 633 A.2d 1362.1364 (1993); State v.
Reding, 119 Wn.2d 685, 835 P.2d 1019, 1023 (1992) (overruling prior contrary authority).
[fii.10] Harmon has not identified, and we have not found, a single case where an arrest for
driving on suspension has been held to be unconstitutional.
This holding should be construed narrowly and does not necessarily apply to other traffic
violations. "It should be the policy of every law enforcement agency to issue citations in lieu of
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arrest of continued custody to the maximum extent at 432 (citing A.B.A. Standards Relating to
Pretrial Release §2.1 (Approved Draft, 1968); see also Parker, 834 P.2d at 595 ("[I]t is difficult
to imagine any circumstances surrounding a routine traffic stop in which [an arrest] would be
justified."). As we stated in Lopez:
[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has
produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must be
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional
questioning."
This issue is again before the Utah Court of Appealse in the case of State v. Mike
Martinez, case number 20041090, where the Court has agreed to hear this issue on interlocatory
appeal.

CONCLUSION

Since the defendand did not fit into any of the four exceptions under 41-6-166, it would
be illegal to arrest him and therefore any search incident to arrest would be illegal.
DATED THIS

/J

day of June, of 2005

^ MARTIN V. GRAVIS
ATTORNEY AT LAW

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I HEREBY certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
SUPPORT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF, this

\^p

day of June, of 2005, to:

BRAD SMITH
DEPUTY BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY

33 S. Main St., 2A
Brigham City, UT 84302
CATHERINE CROMPTON/
SECRETARY

'
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EXHIBIT 4
(State's Opposition to Motion to Suppress)

Amy F. Hugie, No. 8207
Box Elder County Attorney
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
Deputy County Attorney
01 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Tel: (435) 734-3329
Fax: (435) 734-3374
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
STATE OF UTAH,
SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. 051100099

ALFREDO GUTIERREZ,
Defendant.

Judge Ben H. Hadfield

COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through the undersigned Deputy County
Attorney, and opposes Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Officer Gerfen's arrest and
search were justified by the open container in plain view in Defendants vehicle.
Defendant argues that Officer Gerfen obtained illegal consent to search the
vehicle, having no justification to inquire further. To the contrary, the officer's
identification of an open alcohol container in the vehicle justified further search. In State
v. O'Brien. 959 P.2d 647 (Utah Ct App. 1998), the trial court suppressed an officer's
search conducted after the Defendant had made furtive movements, advised the officer
of the presence of a gun in his vehicle, and the officer saw an open alcohol container in
plain view. The Court of Appeals reasoned that where the officer lawfully arrived at a

-1-

place where the open container could be viewed, and the open container was
immediately incriminating, "the [officer] had probable cause to arrest defendant and
lawfully seize the evidence."
This case presents the same circumstances. Officer Gerfen lawfully detained the
Defendant for following too close and speeding when Officer Panter, who was assisting
with the search, spotted an open beer container in plain view. In accordance with
O'ESrien. that incriminating evidence gave officers probable cause to arrest the suspect
and conduct a search incident to arrest. This is also consistent with Utah statute, which
allows an officer to arrest without a warrant "when he has reasonable cause to believe
the person is committing a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing
the person may: ...(c) injure another person..." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(3). An officer
who identifies an individual with an open container in a vehicle has reasonable cause to
believe the individual has committed a public offense and is a danger to other motorists
and his passengers.
Therefore, because there was reasonable cause for the arrest and search, the
officer's search was constitutionally sound. Defendant's motion lacks merit. The State
therefore respectfully requests that the motion be denied.
DATED this

1 ^

day of August, 2005.

BenjarrnirG-Kasmussen
Deputy County Attorney
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this * ^
day of August, 2005,1 faxed and mailed,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Opposition Memorandum, to
the following individual:
Martin V. Gravis
2562 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401
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EXfflBIT 5
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress)
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 051100099
Transcript of Audio CD,

vs .
ALFREDO GUTIERREZ,
Defendant

Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing.
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield presiding.
First District Court Courthouse
Brigham City, Utah
August 15, 2005

APPEARANCES;
For the Plaintiff;

BRAD C. SMITH
Deputy County Attorney

For the Defendant;

MARTIN V. GRAVIS
Attorney at Law

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
P. O. Box 873

Brigham C i t y ,

UT

84302-0873

FILED
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THE CLERK:

Case number 051100099, State of Utah

versus Alfredo Gutierrez.

Counsel, please state your names

for the record.
MR. SMITH:
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

Brad Smith for the state.
Mart.in Gravis for the defendant.

I

This is the time scheduled for a hearing

on a motion to suppress.

Do counsel anticipate presenting

any evidence?
MR. SMITH:
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

No.
No, Your Honor.
Okay.

I111 hear from you.

1
Go ahead.

I've read the memoranda just this morning.
MR. GRAVIS:

1
1

I be lieve it is the state's burden so

they should go first.
MR. SMITH:
as f ollows.

A traffic stop was initiated due to legitimate

reasons to stop.
the car.

Your Honor, the evidence in this case is 1
J

When the stop occurred officers approached

1

Officer Panner in particular saw an open container

1

in the vehicle.

That in t urn led to a further search that

discovered the controlled substance and the possession.

1
J

It is our contention that at each stage of the traffic
stop the officers continued to detain the defendant and

J

sear ched only to dispel su spicions based on reasonable and
observable and articulable facts.

This case is identically

the same as the case we ci ted, State versus O f Brien, in which

J
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the Utah Court of Appeals specifically held that the officer
had probable cause to arrest the defendant and lawfully seize
the evidence.

That case was identically the same.

a traffic stop based on traffic violations.

There was

The violation --

the stop in turn led to the discovery of an open container
and an arrest and a detention.
In this case, Officer Panner, upon approaching the
vehicle, sees the open beer container in plain view.

That

certainly is a basis to detain the vehicle and to search
further.

And so there is in our estimation no Fourth

Amendment issue here whatsoever.
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:

Mr. Gravis.
That!s not quite the situation here.

We agree that he was legitimately pulled over for traffic
violations and the officer approached the vehicle and saw an
open container.

At that point, having no reason to believe

that my client was either presently armed or dangerous, or
that he had any open containers on his person, he extended
the detention to ask content to search my client's person,
which is where the controlled substance was allegedly found.
Not in the vehicle, but on my client!s person.

In OfBrien

there was also drug paraphernalia.
THE COURT:

He didn't say about the open container

until -MR. GRAVIS:

I'm not objecting to the open
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container.

We have no cause -- we agree that that was in

plain view and the officer could lawfully seize it.

It's the

contraband allegedly found on my client that we're objecting
to on the basis that there was no reason to extend the
duration of the detention to ask consent to search.
Based upon the cases we cited in our memorandum, Godina,
Luna, the purpose of the original stop was for the traffic
violation.

The officer had reason to extend it for the open

container, but not to extend it to search my client's person.
And so that makes the detention illegal because of Terry.
All the cases say you can only detain a person as long as
necessary for what you detained him for.

He has to be free

to go before you can ask for consent to search the person.
If he's not free to go, that's an illegal detention.
We anticipate that the state's next argument is that it
was a search incident to a lawful arrest.

It's our position,

under 41-6-166, that the officer did not have the legal right
to arrest him.

That again is different from O'Brien because

in O'Brien there was also drug paraphernalia.
41-6-166 says for any violation of something contained in
41-6 an officer should issue a citation unless there's the
four exceptions, which are when the person arrested demands
an immediate appearance before a magistrate.
did not.

Mr. Gutierrez

When the person arrested is on a charge of driving

or being in actual physical control of a vehicle under the
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influence of any drug or combination thereof as prescribed in
section 41-6-44.

That is also not the case.

When the person

is arrested upon a charge of failure to stop in the event of
an accident causing death, personal injury or damage to
property.

That is also not the case.

And lastly, in any other event when the person arrested
refuses to give his written promise to appear in court as
hereinafter provided; or when, in the discretion of the
arresting officer, a written promise to appear is
insufficient.

In this case the officer testified that he

J exercises no discretion.

He arrests everybody he stops for

open container.
He had no reason to believe that Mr. Guitierrez wouldn!t
appear on the citation.

During the preliminary hearing he

testified he didn't remember whether or not he had a valid
J license or where he lived.

Number one, he's not been charged

with driving on suspension or driving without no license.
Number two, the court records clearly indicate he resides
here in Brigham City.
It's our position that under 41-6-166 the arrest was
unlawful and therefore the search cannot be saved as a search
incident to an arrest.
THE COURT:

Mr. Smith.

MR. SMITH:

The argument arising out of section 166

is certainly interesting.

It's also irrelevant.

Section 166
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simply doesn't go to the legality of a search or a seizure.
Itfs not intended to address that and it simply doesn't.
1

We ask the question in a Fourth Amendment case based on
the totality of the circumstances.

In this case what the

defense is asking yo u to do is to pull apart all of the
strands and cut them down one by one.

What you have is

1

somebody who is spee ding through town, who is observed, and
is lawfully stopped.

When the st.op is initiated the open

container is found.
At that point th e question is is it legitimate to further
detain the occupants for further investigation?

Given the

totality of the circumstances, I do not believe the court can
reasonably say that the officer's behavior was unreasonable

1

in requesting consen-t.
Based on the tot<ality of the circumstances, it's the
state!s contention that it was a lawful stop and a lawful

J
J

seizure and there's no basis to s uppress under the applicable
The state will submit the matter.

case law.

THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:
MR. SMITH:

1

Go ahead.
I do agree that

—

Your Honor, I'm going to object.

If

it ! s my burden I get the last word.
THE COURT:

I know.

I'm letting him have it both

ways here.
MR. GRAVIS:

This isn't beyond a resonable doubt so

J
1
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I think

—
THE COURT:

No.

What he's suggesting is if it was

your motion you could start the argument and end it.

If the

burden is on him he starts and ends it.
MR. GRAVIS:

In civil cases both sides get to argue

the same number of times.
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:

This is the same burden.

Go ahead.
Anyway, our po sition is that, yes, he

did have the right to investigate th e open container, but
when the officer has no lawful -- no facts to believe that
the defendant had an open container on his person, that is
then an unjustifiabl e detention.

It increases the detention

unjustifiably to con duct something not within the reasonable
stop.

He ? s extendin g the duration o f the detention for

something not connected with what he 1s investigating.
The case law is -- there's lots of case law besides
Godina and Luna that says an officer may not extend the

1

duration of the stop to ask for consent to search without a
reasonable belief th at he would find something on the person.
There's absolutely no facts that he would find any open
containers.

1

And it1 s not connected in any way with an open

container violation, a speeding viol ation or following too
close violation.

We submit that the search is illegal.

THE COURT:

As I understand the facts counsel have

submitted, the defen dant is lawfully pulled over for

1
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speeding, and other traffic offenses, within the limits of
Brigham City.

During the stop, and a discussion about that,

one of the two officers observes an open container of an
alcoholic beverage in the passenger section of the vehicle
where the people are, not in the trunk.

Under those

circumstances the officer would have the right, in this
court's view, at a minimum to further pursue the matter,
perhaps by conducting sobriety tests with the driver or other
things, to ensure that he has not been consuming and there's

1

no impairment.

J

You already have a traffic violation.

When you couple

that with the presence of alcohol, I think it would be

1

negligent on the officer's part to not do some follow up

J

there.

J

Now, in that case he's entitled to detain for some
additional time to conduct those types of activities.

J
The

officer, as I understand it, asked would it be okay to

1

conduct a pat down, a search.

J

The defendant apparently

consented and then some contraband was found in a pocket on

I

the defendant.

J

Is that correct?

MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

1

Under those circumstances the court

finds that the request for permission to search was a

J

legitimate one in as much as the request was granted, consent J
was granted.

The court denies the motion to suppress the
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evidence
Now, I can give you some time before we schedule a
I donf t k now how much time you feel you need.

pretrial

MR. GRAVIS:

We'll be asking for written findings of

fact and conclusions of law.
Is the court going to address the second part of the
argument if we were to take it up on appeal?
THE COURT:
MR. GRAVIS:

With regards to releasing him?
No.

With regards to the second part of

the argument about the -MR. SMITH:

The 166?

THE COURT:

Right.

Releasing him -- issuing a

citation rather than arresting him.

Under the circumstances

I!m not going to -- well, I guess I could address that in
this sense.

If I fi nd that the pat down search was lawful,

then once they found the drugs they're not under an
obligation at that p oint to issue him a citation and send him
on his way.

So I th ink it kinds of loops that argument.

MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

Okay.
Mr. Smith, if you would prepare a

proposed set of find ings.

Now, I can offer you a pretrial

probably September 12th or September 26th if you have a
preference.

1:30 ei ther one.

MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

Those are both Mondays.

The 12th would be the best.
All right.

September 12th, 1:30, for a
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pretrial conference.

We'll see you then.

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, just to make sure, when you

sign the findings of fact and conclusions of law will you
make note to send me a copy?

Last time I didn't get a copy

until almost time -MR. SMITH:

I'll send you a copy of the findings

before they go to the court and wait ten days to submit them.
MR. GRAVIS:
THE COURT:

Okay.
That way we'll you'll have an

opportunity to object.
(Hearing concluded.)

All right.
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C E R T I F I C A T E

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the audio CD recorded hearing was
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for
the State of Utah.
That a full, true and correct transcription of the
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the
pages numbered 2 to 10, inclusive.
I further certify that the original transcript was
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box Elder
County, Brigham City, Utah.
Dated this 11th day of September, 2006.

m- UAJ

Rodney M.(;Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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EXfflBIT 6
(Objection to Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law)

MARTIN V. GRAVIS (# 1237)

Attorneys for Defendant
2562 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 392-8231
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IN THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
STATE OF UTAH, BOX ELDER DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
vs.

OBJECTION TO THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

ALFREDO GUTIERREZ,

Case No. 051100099

Defendant.
COMES NOW Defendant,

JUDGE BEN HADFIELD

by and through his Attorney, Martin Gravis,and hereby objects to

the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
1.

Paragraph 3 in the Findings of Fact should read as follows:
Officer Gerfen subsequently requested consent to search the defendant's person prior
to issuing the citation and without a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts
that the defendant had any alcohol on his person.

2.

The Court did not reach any decision on the issue of paragraph 1 of the Conclusions
of Law.

DATED

this 2 day of September, of 2005

MARTIN V. GRAVIS
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

STATE OF UTAH VS. ALFREDO G U T I E R R ^
OBJECTION TO THE FINDINGS OF FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Case No. 051100099

CERTIFICATE OF D:

I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,

this 2 day of September, of 2005, to:

AMIEHUGIE
Box ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY

01 S. Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302

CATHERINE CROMPTON
^CATHERINE
SECRETARY

2
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EXHIBIT 7
(Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Objection to
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.)

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND'F&R l7 r, i:
BOX ELDER COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
HON. BEN H. HADFIELD

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ALFREDO GUTIERREZ,
Defendant.

Case No. 051100099

This matter comes before the Court, pursuant to the defendant's
Objection to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, proposed by the
prosecution. These findings and conclusions are a result of the hearing which
occurred before the Court on August 15, 2005.
The Court has reviewed the proposed findings and conclusions, the
objection of the defendant, and a transcript of the August 15th hearing. The
Court, now being fully advised in the matter, determines that the proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law comport with the decision issued by
this Court from the bench on August 15th and therefore, simultaneous with the
entry of this memorandum decision, the Court will sign and enter the findings
and conclusions.
This matter is scheduled for a pre-trial conference on November 7, 2005
at 1^30 p.m.
Dated this /7 riav of October, 2005.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the

ay of October, 2005, I mailed a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision in the case of State
vs. Gutierrez, case number 051100099, as follows:

Amy F. Hugie
Box Elder County Attorney
01 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302

Martin V. Gravis
Attorney At Law
2562 Washington Blvd
Ogden, Utah 84401

ffmm
Clerk of Court l
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EXHIBIT 8
(Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law)

Amy F. Hugie, No. 8207
Box Elder County Attorney
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
Deputy County Attorney
01 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Tel: (435) 734-3329
Fax: (435) 734-3374
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
STATE OF UTAH,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff,
Criminal No. 051100099

vs.
ALFREDO GUTIERREZ,
Defendant.

Judge Ben H. Hadfield

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence
seized in the course of a search of Defendant's person and vehicle. The matter came
before the Court for oral arguments on August 15, 2005. The State was represented by
Deputy County Attorney Brad C. Smith. Defendant was present and represented by
Martin Gravis. The Court having reviewed the memoranda and considered the
arguments of counsel, now enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On March 6, 2005, the Defendant was lawfully pulled over for traffic violations
including speeding and following too close.

2. While Officer Gerfen contacted the driver, Officer Panter approached on the
passenger side of the vehicle and observed an open container of alcohol in plain
view.
3. Officer Gerfen subsequently requested consent to search the Defendant's
person.
4. Consent was voluntarily given.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Under State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the officers
had probable cause for arrest based on the open container seen in the vehicle.
2. In the alternative, upon discovery of an open container, the officers had an
obligation to investigate further to determine whether the Defendant was
impaired or otherwise a danger to the community.
3. Officer Gerfen's request for consent was justified under the law based on his
discovery of the open container of alcohol and need to dispel any fear that the
Defendant may have posed a danger to other members of the community.
4. Defendant's argument that his arrest was illegal under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6166 is rendered moot by the officers' discovery of methamphetamine on
Defendant's person. The discovery of methamphetamine pursuant to a lawful
search was a legitimate basis for arrest.

5. Defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied.

oA.

DATED this

tl

day of September, 2005.

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this Q>
day ofrOeptemteer, 2005,1 mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, to the following individual:
Martin V. Gravis
2562 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401

Rule 7 Notice
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), the undersigned will submit the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Judge Hadfield of the First Judicial District
Court of Box Elder County, for signature, upon the expiration of eight (8) days from 31
August 2005, unless written objection is filed prior to that time

3enjamin C KSsmussen
rasmussen
Benjamin
Deputy County Attorney

A

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify ths»t on this o '
day ofcSeptemfcer, 2005,1 mailed, postage
prepaid, a true and conetA copy oi \tefore90Vn9 Prapo^ti Findings. o1 F a c \ a ^
Conclusions of Law, to the following individual:
Martin V. Gravis
2562 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401

Rule 7 Notice
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), the undersigned will submit the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Judge Hadfield of the First Judicial District
Court of Box Elder County, for signature, upon the expiration of eight (8) days from 31
August 2005, unless written objection is filed prior to that time

Benjamin C KS^mussen
Benjamin
Kasmussen
Deputy County Attorney
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EXHIBIT 9
(Order on Motion for Rehearing or Motion to Suppress and Stay Entry of
Findings of Facts)

Martin V. Gravis #1237
Attorney for Defendant
2562 Washington Blvd.
Ogden,Utah 84401
Telephone: 392-8231
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR REHEARING OR MOTION
TO SUPPRESS AND TO STAY ENTRY OF
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

vs.
Alfredo Gutierrez,

I

Case No.051100099

Defendant.
COMES NOW

Judge: Ben H. Hadfield

Defendant, by and through his Attorney of record, Martin V. Gravis, and

hereby moves the above entitled Court for a rehearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress and to
Stay Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Said Motion is based upon the Court's
Conclusion of Law Number 1 and the fact that the Court determined at the suppression hearing that
it was unnecessary for the Court to rule on the issue as to whether said arrest would have been legal
under Utah Code Annotated 41 -6-166.
DATED THIS jj_ DAY OF OCTOBER 2005

s

1

Martm V. Gravis
Attorney at Law

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Motion it is hereby ordered that a rehearing on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress be held on the 7th day of November, 2005 at 1:30 p.m., and the entry of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be stayed until said hearing.
Dated this

day of October, 2005
BY THE COURT:

/^

^

^ f i e n H . Hadfield
JUDGE, District Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, MOTION FOR
REHEARING OR MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND TO STAY ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, via First-Class Mail, Postage Prepaid this
ofOctober,2005to:
Amy F. Hugie
Box Elder County Attorney
01 South Main Street
Brigham City Utah 84302
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